

- mis-operation -

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disclaimer

- This is not:
to accuse someone, products or vendors
- This is:
to learn something from experiences 😊


We have made lots of mistakes

- In many case, its effects are negligible (hopefully), but sometimes even a small mistake could cause a disaster
- Let's look into our mistakes
 - frequent ones and major outages
- These cases are gathered from Japanese operational community. Thanks!

No.1 cut & paste of configuration

- One person was writing a router configuration by cutting & pasting from other routers'.
- but... forgot to modify IP address setting ☹️
- caused unwanted routing, IP address duplications

No.1 cut & paste of configuration



No.2 replacing a router

- One person was asked to replace an existing router to new one
- The person connected the new router to a live network by configuring certain interface though the existing router was still running 😞
- There were 2 routers on the network having the same IP address on their loopback or other interfaces

No.2 replacing a router

existing router

```
Interface loopback0  
ipv4 address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.255  
ipv6 address 2001:db8::1/128  
!
```

new router

```
Interface loopback0  
ipv4 address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.255  
ipv6 address 2001:db8::1/128  
!
```




before removing the existing router, the person connected the new router. even worse ospf was running on the routers

No.3 cable maintenance

- There was a scheduled maintenance at a long distance cable in a network, so one person incremented OSPF link costs on the link
- To avoid flapping on the link, the person disabled OSPF on the link ☹️
- During the maintenance window, another cable was down
- ... the network was divided


No.3 cable maintenance



No.4 router reload

- One person performed a firmware upgrade of a router.
- The person changed OSPF link costs to reroute traffic, and reloaded the router ... without saving the configuration 😞
- After reloading the router, OSPF was established, and packets are discarded until BGP is converged
 - OSPF Stub Router Advertisement [RFC3137] would solve this

No.4 router reload




OSPF considered this link is the shortest to go, but packets are discarded until BGP is converged

No.5 port move

- One team performed a maintenance to move a cable from one switch to another
- One person shutdown a port, then another person unplug the cable checking the port number and the port LED.
- The person at the switch misunderstood the port number and port LED relationship, then unplugged an wrong cable 😞
- Unexpected network down


No.5 port move



No.6 cable removal

- There were lots of unused cables under racks, so one person tried to remove by cutting down connectors and pulling out cables.
- The person found a fiber with MIC connector, and considered it as FDDI – it means unused anymore, then cut down the MIC connector. ☹️
- But this fiber was actually used for a GbE link as a multimode fiber, so this caused unexpected fiber cut.


No.6 cable removal



No.7 new BGP session on cisco

- One person were writing a configuration for a new BGP peering session on a Cisco router.
- The person typed the setting line by line, but before completing all of the configuration, the router established a BGP session without filter policy. ☹️
- The router announced full-table with internal more specifics.
 - use 'conf net' to avoid this
 - firstly put a fake remote-as setting, and after complete policy setting , overwrite with a real remote-as number

No.7 new BGP session on cisco




No.8 new interface for eBGP

- One person configured a new private peering, and the AS has a policy to keep a received nexthop address as is - no nexthop-self.
- The person established a BGP session before announcing the network on the link for eBGP. ☹️
- Unexpected best path selection, or unexpected traffic flow.
 - BGP performs recursive route lookup using Routing Table including BGP to find immediate next_hop (RFC4271)

No.8 new interface for eBGP

AS policy: keep a received nexthop address as is




No.9 new router for eBGP

- One person installed a new router to connect an IX, and the AS has a policy to rewrite a received nexthop address to its internal address – performing nexthop-self
- The person forgot to put a nexthop-self policy for iBGP sessions on the router 😞
- After setting up eBGP sessions with other ASes, they met unexpected routing.
 - BGP performs recursive route lookup using Routing Table including BGP to find immediate next_hop (RFC4271)

No.9 new router for eBGP


AS policy: always rewrite a received nexthop



No.10 BGP FIB reducing

- One person was asked to filter BGP routes on small routers to avoid memory overflow
- The person forgot to add default route that would cover filtered routes on the routes ☹️
- The router lost routes, caused packets discard


No.10 BGP FIB reducing



No.11 BGP soft reconfiguration

- One person changed a filter policy for eBGP on a cisco router, and tried to perform soft reconfiguration to reevaluate in-RIB.
- The person forgot to add 'soft' keyword when typing 'clear ip bgp neighbor XXX soft', the session was actually reset. ☹️
- Unwanted session flapping


No.11 BGP soft reconfiguration



No.12 route termination

- One prefix was statically routed to a downstream router, and the downstream router had default route to upstream.
- But the downstream network used only a part of the prefix, and no care for unused space. ☹️
- Packets to unused space like portscan were looped between 2 routers.
 - they should add a null route to terminate route at the downstream router, or
 - they should adjust the routed prefix as needed


No.12 route termination



No.13 redistribute

- One person was asked to delete OSPF to BGP redistribution at a router
- The person tried to delete the configuration with leading 'no' keyword, but this deleted filter policy of the redistribution. ☹️
- All OSPF routes were redistributed into BGP, and these were announced to other ASes.

No.13 redistribute




```
router bgp 65535  
redistribute ospf 65535 route-map ospf-to-bgp
```

One person was asked to delete entire line, but the person deleted filter policy by leading 'no' keyword

No.14 packet filter

- One person was asked to modify packet filter of a remote router
- The person forgot to permit management access ☹️
- After modification, the person was also filtered out, and couldn't control anymore

No.14 packet filter



One person tried to modify packet filter remotely but the person forgot to permit management access, and lost his remote connection.

No.15 console logging

- A router was configured to send log messages to a serial console port
- One person enabled debug on the router, and tons of messages were sent to console. ☹️
- The serial console was low speed like 9600bps, and the tons of messages chewed up the port. The router became unstable...

No.15 console logging

One person enabled debug on a router, and tons of log messages were sent to a serial console. This was enough to chew up the port, and router became unstable.

serial console

speed=9600




```
Jul 6 21:50:26 487: LC/0/1/CPU0:Jul 6 21:50:26.275 JST-9: jacket[163]: %L2-SPA-5-STATE_CHANGE: SPA in bay 1 Initing
Jul 6 21:50:29 488: LC/0/1/CPU0:Jul 6 21:50:29.569 JST-9: jacket[163]: %L2-SPA-5-STATE_CHANGE: SPA in bay 1 now is up and running
Jul 6 21:50:30 489: RP/0/RP0/CPU0:Jul 6 21:50:30.017 JST-9: invmgr[206]: %PLATFORM-INV-6-NODE_STATE_CHANGE: Node: 0/1/1, state: OK
:
```

No.16 remote login

- One person was asked to change configuration on a certain router.
- The person mistyped the remote hostname, but it was still valid one, so the person changed configuration on a wrong router 😞
 - There was a similar case that typing in a wrong terminal among multi terminal windows.
- ..causes an unexpected routing


No.16 remote login



No.17 serial console login

- One person tried to change configuration through serial console, but before that someone used the console terminal to access a remote router, and the session was still there.
- The person was unaware of that and changed configuration on a wrong router 😞
- caused unexpected routing


No.17 serial console login



No.18 configuration cleaning

- One person was asked to delete unused configuration of a router
- The person deleted line by line with leading 'no' keyword, and carelessly deleted a routing process. ☹️
- The router stopped the routing process as the command said so.....

No.18 configuration cleaning



expected configuration

```
router ospf 65535  
no network 10.0.0.0 0.0.0.3 area 0
```

but typed in

```
no router ospf 65535  
no network 10.0.0.0 0.0.0.3 area 0
```

The routing process was stopped,
... caused a routing trouble

No.19 bug

- new firmware, new future, new attribute
- It was tested before install, but in a live network sometimes something is different.

No.19 bug



No.20 remote access from home

- One person accessed a router from home.
- Suddenly “Daddy!!!!” – his kid ran into him, and then due to the shock, he pasted buffer to the terminal. ☹
- fortunately, any of the lines were not accepted by the router – just errors.

No.20 remote access from home




What we want

- to keep our services available
 - react to anything that causes service deterioration
 - mistake is also a cause of deterioration
 - even more we aim for better services
- minimize the effect of mistakes

react to mistakes

- minimize the effects
- reduce mistakes



minimize the effects of mistakes

- protection
 - straiten the extent of the impact
 - multiple route filters
- restoration
 - detect in early stage
 - monitor of configuration changes, traffic anomaly detection
 - notification properly
 - notify the operator of the mistake
 - recovery from mistake quickly
 - undo the modification, disconnect the wrong part

reduce mistakes

- In many cases, the main reason of mistakes is “careless”
 - more detailed classification would be possible
 - as you might know, to understand others (even yourself) is difficult

mistake, operators and attention


- OK, let's put an assumption
- An attention ability is limited, and it depends on operators and environments
 - If you have enough ability to complete an operation, there would be zero-mistake.

but according to our experiences

- We have made lots of mistakes
 - we don't have enough ability, or have abilities to mistake :P
- So we need a support to reduce mistakes

support for operation

- minimum hand-operation
 - automation
- clear procedure of operation
 - operation sheet
- support for attention
 - better user interface to help operations



we have done that,
and keep improving

end